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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #01471-86
19 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
NIO for Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities

SUBJECT : SIG-I Meeting, 20 March 1986

1. These are my own comments and recommendations on General Stilwell's paper that you will address at the 20 March meeting. Ordinarily I would work my comments into a version coordinated among CI Staff and the Office of Security but that wasn't possible on this paper.

2. An overall observation: The SSCI Staff appears to be determined, both in the CM section of its report as well as in the earlier CI section, to establish a single position in the NSC structure to oversee a Security Program. It is reasonably clear that they envision this position to be in the NSC staff structure and not synonymous with the DCI or the SIG-I structure. The SSCI Staff is aided and abetted in this by Ken deGraffenreid and David Major. I find it difficult to believe that anyone with management experience of any sort could endorse this single body, single official approach to managing the CI and security functions of the USG. General Stilwell's comment (final paragraph commenting on recommendation #1, found on top of his page 2) clearly opposes the SSCI Staff recommendation but you may wish to stress the objection even more sharply in the SIG-I meeting or in the written reply.

3. Recommendation #11 (p. 5, Stilwell paper). The comment is not clear and it also would tend to blur the distinction between standards for a Top Secret and a SCI clearance. The DoD position for some years has been to have common standards; i.e., use lower standards for both. Whatever changes are made in this comment for purposes of clarity, you should urge higher standards for the more sensitive clearance.

4. Recommendation #14 (p. 6, Stilwell paper). The comment is not consistent with CIA/DO requirements that occasionally arise where access to classified material may be given an agent without the "clearing procedure" alluded to in the comment. It may not be necessary to raise the point.

5. Recommendation #20 (p. 8). The wording of the first part of the comment implies that the DoD will always make limited use of the polygraph, unlike CIA and NSA. The language should be loosened to allow for broader use of the polygraph without actually mandating it.

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
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6. Recommendation #21 (p. 8). The simple "concur" implies that DoD is locking itself into limited use of the polygraph (CI-related) and ruling out broader use. The language should be relaxed to give DoD flexibility to adopt a broader use policy when it perceives the need and when the political environment permits.

7. Recommendation #25 (p. 9). This comment equivocates on an issue of fundamental importance, stopping leaks. Gaining control of disclosures of classified material, having an authorized procedure for declassifying information for authorized disclosures, is basic to the solution of this problem. Here, we have the SSCI about to go on record urging the President to control leaks to the news media and we want further study? We should concur with the recommendation! Later, when the news media criticize the Executive Branch for trying to control leaks we can point to SSCI support for our program. We know there are rules to be squared and we can agonize over those in silence.

8. Recommendation #39 and #40 (pp. 14-15). The comments suggest a rewrite of both recommendations. I suggest that you agree to Stilwell's comments with one reservation: that a permanent charter of anything like the Technical Security Coordinating Group should place it under the SECOM and not start breaking up the unified approach to security.


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